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ABSTRACT 
This paper introduces and applies an analytical framework to study how formal and 
informal institutions influence socio–economic change and poverty reduction in 
rural Cambodia, giving specific reference to property rights and collective action. It 
focuses on emerging endogenous mechanisms of cooperation as well as on the role 
of external actors and instruments in forming or enhancing collective action 
institutions, and enforcing use and ownership rights among the rural poor. Within 
this framework key contextual factor, such as asset endowments, legal structures, 
and power relations, have an impact on poverty and rural livelihoods, but are also 
mediated and changed by property right regimes and local cooperation. Findings 
indicate that access to and use of natural capital still contributes significantly to 
rural incomes. Access to natural resources is, however, defined by multiple and 
overlapping rights, both private and common ones, which are, in turn, governed by 
formal and informal patterns of cooperation. Collective action also contributes to 
improve livelihoods. Nevertheless, depending on asset endowments, differences 
exist in the degree of participation. Owing to Cambodia’s recent history of genocide, 
forced collectivization and resettlement, property rights regimes have been severely 
affected, remain contested, and are re–established only slowly. In this context, the 
mutual trust necessary for successful cooperation in common property issues is 
severely undermined. 
Keywords: collective action, property rights, Cambodia, poverty traps, natural 
resources, rights, common property 
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ESCAPING POVERTY TRAPS? 




 and Michael Kirk
1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Collective action and property rights are able to shape peoples’ livelihoods. Property 
rights shape peoples’ claim on benefit streams out of their owned resources and 
have an impact on peoples’ asset base. In a cross–country study Heitger (2003) 
shows that improved property rights have a strong positive impact on living 
standards. The better property rights are suited to address people’s needs, the 
better their chance to shape their livelihoods and to escape poverty traps. Secure 
access to resources increases a household’s capital base and will broaden (poor) 
people’s capacities to engage in activities to improve their well–being. Effective 
collective action can also enable households to improve their well–being. Engaging 
in activities collectively can, for example, increase people’s access to resources, 
secure against idiosyncratic shocks, or achieve common goals that are impossible to 
achieve at individual level. Thus collective action also becomes part of people’s 
strategies to shape property rights and increase well–being. 
Both property rights and collective action were severely challenged in 
Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge regime. After democratic consolidation, attempts to 
(re-)create a legal framework that secures access to land and natural resources 
were made by the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) and strongly supported by 
all major donors. Nevertheless the introduction of laws, decrees and sub decrees 
created new uncertainties among the rural poor and advantaged the more powerful 
(Global Witness, 2007). Resource degradation and conversion of natural resources 
into arable land leaves Cambodia’s rural poor with ever less options to derive 
income from these resources. Furthermore, a relatively slow rate of land titling in 
rural areas or clear demarcations leaves the poor, less powerful people vulnerable 
to land grabbing and exclusion from benefit streams out of common property. 
Collective action also still suffers from the Khmer Rouge legacy as large parts of 
traditional social ties such as mutual help, religious institutions and even family ties 
have been destroyed (Mehmet, 1997). Collectivization under the communist regime 
of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea also left marks on Cambodians’ willingness 
to cooperate at a larger extent in agriculture. 
The objective of this case–study is to identify effective practices and policies 
that enhance the way in which cooperation/collective action and property rights are 
used to build up secure assets and income streams for the rural poor in Cambodia. 
In order to provide policy makers, community groups, civil society organizations 
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and researchers with a better understanding on the property rights systems in 
place, the project assesses existing property rights systems in rural Cambodia to 
identify what benefit streams poor people can rely on for their livelihood. The 
project identifies forms and mechanisms of economic and social cooperation, how 
they influence property rights systems, and to what extent rural poor are part of 
village networks. Based on this assessment, the linkages between property rights, 
collective action, and poverty are analyzed. In addition, it explores what resources 
poor households use, by what property rights systems these resources are 
governed, and if collective action helps poor people to address their needs. 
This study shows that mutual help, religious activities, and small scale 
associations are regaining ground in Cambodia. However, these associations, even 
though aiming to help the rural poor, actually cannot reach them properly. Poor 
people lack confidence to take part in those associations and sometimes are unable 
to use the services offered by them.
2 In addition, collective action to secure natural 
resources is not yet successful to address ongoing resource degradation. Formal, 
legally backed institutions lack local recognition and are thus unable to enforce 
rules set to protect the resource. Villages that mange their resources following 
traditional principles tend to cooperate better across village boundaries and are 
thus more successful in natural resource management. Nevertheless, they too are 
unable to protect them against interventions of outsiders.
3 Another explanation for 
low degrees of cooperation in natural resource management are low degrees of 
trust. Missing trust will have to be considered when implementing development 
projects on the ground. 
2.  THE CAMBODIAN BACKGROUND 
Cambodia is a South– East Asian country with a Gross National Income per Capita 
of US$380 (World Bank, 2006). Its main income source is agriculture (19.1 percent 
of GDP, 2005 current prices)
4 growing at a below average rate. Around 80 percent 
of the Cambodian population lives in rural areas, where 72.5 percent are employed 
in the agricultural sector.
5 In 2004, 35 percent of the Cambodian population lived 
below the national poverty line of US$0.45 per capita per day, with highest poverty 
incidence in rural areas. Based on 2004 data, 39 percent of the rural population are 
classified as poor, compared to 5 percent in Phnom Penh and 25 percent in other 
urban areas (World Bank, 2006). Cambodians living in rural areas account for 
nearly 91 percent of the overall country’s poor (World Bank, 2006). This high level 
of poverty incidence has largely resulted from high population pressure in the rain 
fed lowlands on limited natural resources,
6 inadequate job opportunities and low 
capabilities, insecurity on access to land and other productive assets, continuing 
exclusion of poor communities from economic growth, and high vulnerability due to 
                                                      
 
2 As an example: Rice banks are not suited to generate extra income for landless or land–  poor 
households. They provide rice for a lower interest as the surplus gained through the harvest. However, 
landless and land– poor often are not able to generate the surplus but rather borrow for consumption 
purposes. They are only able to pay back the loan if they are able to generate enough money from 
other income sources. 
3 People considered to be outsiders can be understood as people that migrate temporarily to other 
districts or provinces or powerful people that do not have close ties to the villages.  
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natural disasters, violence, and economic shocks (EIC, 2005; World Bank, 1999).
7 
Although more than 70 percent of Cambodia’s population are employed in 
agricultural production, large shares of them do not have access to arable land. 
Landlessness among rural households rose from 12.6 percent in 1997 to 19.6 
percent in 2004 (RCG, 2002; Sophal et al., 2001; World Bank, 2006).  
 
Rural Economy 
Most of the population lives in low arable plains crossed by many rivers, with the 
two most important being the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap. Natural resources 
play an important role in securing livelihoods for those poor as they contribute to a 
large share to household incomes (World Bank, 2006) and are able to contribute to 
poverty reduction if secure access and sustainable use is given (Hach and Sothea, 
2004). In Cambodian rural areas natural resources contribute to multiple uses for 
income generation of multiple users, ranging from collecting non– timber forest 
products for subsistence to additional income generation through logging at 
different scales. Access to these natural resources is, however, defined by multiple 
and often overlapping rights, both private and common, which are in turn governed 
by formal and informal patterns of cooperation. Therefore, the ability to decide and 
act together plays an important role in improving rural livelihoods. Privately owned 
parcels of forests do not inhibit villager’s rights to gather mushrooms, hunt animals, 
or graze cattle within the forested area as long as timber or other commercially 
used products remain untouched. Flooded rice fields are open to villagers to catch 
crabs or small fish in the fields and become common grazing ground after they 
have been harvested. There are also concession systems in place that are granted 
to private parties by the state for economic exploitation. Here, access and 
extraction rights are regulated through different legal texts.
8 There are overlapping 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
4 Agriculture is followed by garment industries (13.2 percent of GDP) and fisheries (9.8 percent of 
GDP).  
5 Employment in the agricultural sector includes employed rural laborers as well as self employed 
and unpaid family workers. The share of people employed in overall Cambodia is 67.6 percent. 
6 According to UNFPA (2005) Cambodia’s population growth rate is 2.4 percent, which is relatively 
high compared with neighboring countries where population is growing by 1.4 percent in Vietnam and 
1.0 percent in Thailand. Furthermore, Cambodian population is less concentrated in the cities than its 
neighbors’ population. 
7 Such shocks are consumer or oil price shocks and deteriorating terms of trade for exported 
goods. 
8 In the fishery sector, for example, a fishing concession system is in place, where the Department 
of Fisheries (DoF) as part of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) grants 
concessions for commercial fishing. The Fisheries Law (2006) defines rules of access, boundaries, user 
rights, authorities, and enforcement. It is based on the separation of the fishery domains into 
industrial fishing, preserved fishing, and subsistence fishing areas. Fishing lot “owners” who lease 
those lots for a two years period do have the right to exclusively fish in their lot, excluding the area 
that is reserved as “open access area”. Medium scale fishing is allowed in public domains (such as 
outside fishing lots and protected areas) after paying for a licence that grants access rights. Fishing 
lots and medium scale fisheries are prohibited during the “closed” season. Subsistence fishing is 
allowed in all public domains throughout the whole year and within the lots during the “closed” season 
(McKenney and Tola, 2002). However, there are informal cooperation schemes that affect subsistence  
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rights in floodplains, where agricultural land or forests are (temporarily) flooded 
and become fishing habitats. In these areas agriculture, fisheries and forestry 
compete for scarce resources: water used for irrigation may decrease fish yields; 
extensive harvest of forest products or land clearings destroys fish habitats; 
pesticides and fertilizers used in agriculture reduce water quality and thus fish 
yields.  
As an outcome of the process of political stabilization and re– establishing 
government institutions in the country from the mid 1990s on, cooperative 
management approaches were recognized (or even re–invented) by the 
government, civil society organizations, and the private sector as potentially 
successful governance patterns not only for individual livelihood generation but also 
to achieve a more sustainable resource use. As an example, traditional forms of 
cooperation in Cambodia are centred on the pagoda, the Buddhist temple. They are 
based on the donations villagers give to a pagoda committee. In the first place, 
they provide for the monks’ food but are also used to repair the pagoda, establish 
rice banks, and give food and shelter to the most vulnerable villagers. Several 
NGOs thus use pagodas as an entry point to introduce or support not only socio– 
economic self– help groups but also to raise awareness for sustainable resource 
use, to replant forests, or to initiate resource management organizations. In the 
fisheries and forestry sector the RGC aims to hand over natural resource 
management to local users. The Fishery Communities
9 set up for this purpose shall 
manage, protect, develop, and use the fishing resource in a sustainable way. With 
the instrument of Community Forests
10 the state recognizes and aims to ensure 
traditional forest use rights of villages and communes.  
Civil War 
To understand the sensitivity of these recent initiatives and the high risk of failure 
in their implementation, it is important to take Cambodians recent history of civil 
war into account. In 1975 the Khmer Rouge came into power and introduced an 
agrarian totalitarian communism to a dimension not known before (Chandler, 
1996). Cambodians were organized in brigades that had to provide forced labor 
under unbearable conditions. The Khmer Rouge abolished private ownership, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
fishery negatively: fishing lot owners do cooperate (illegally) with the military to inhibit subsistence 
fishing even when subsistence fishing is allowed within the lots (Van Acker, 2003). In the forest 
concession system, the MAFF gives concessions to private companies that then exercise exclusive 
rights on the resource. These systems has been widely criticized as the concessions have been 
awarded without consideration of environmental and social impacts, and lack clear boundaries and 
evaluation criteria for sustained yield (Fraser et al. 2000, Global Witness, 2007). 
9 The term Fishery Community is used in the 2006 Fisheries Law to describe formal institutions 
that are registered with the Cambodian government. In the text the term “Fishery Community 
Organization” will be used to refer to those management institutions only.  
10 Community Forests are defined by the 2002 Forestry Law as an “area of state forest granted 
under an agreement to manage and utilize the forest in a sustainable manner between the Forest 
Administration and a local community or organized group of people living within or near the forest 
area and dependent upon it for subsistence and traditional use”. (Article 5/8) In the text the term 
“Community Forest Organization” will be used to refer to institutions that are registered with the 
government or are in the registration process.  
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literally destroyed existing infrastructure including written evidence on land 
ownership or use rights, and systematically killed intellectuals, government 
employees, and monks. Cooperative institutions related to religious services and 
the life around the Buddhist pagodas were abolished (Mehmet, 1997). It is 
estimated that over one million citizens
11 died during the Khmer Rouge regime 
(Chandler, 1996). In 1979, Vietnamese troops overcame the Khmer Rouge regime 
and introduced an economic model based on the ideas of a centrally planned 
economy and of state owned rural producer cooperatives. Violent conflicts 
continued in different parts of the country, and only after elections in 1993 Khmer 
Rouge accepted to turn in their weapons. Currently Cambodia superficially appears 
to be a peaceful country; however, the years of unrest left marks on Cambodia’s 
physical, human, and social capital with a painful reconstruction process still 
ongoing.  
Legal Pluralism 
Practised property rights systems include not only the legal foundations of a state 
but also take informal rights into account such as statutory, traditional, and 
customary rights. This coexistence of different sources of rights is referred to as 
legal pluralism (Griffiths, 1986; Merry, 1988; Meinzen–Dick et al., 2002). Legal 
pluralism exists in Cambodia, as Simbolon (2002) states relating this to its specific 
socio–political history. Property rights have developed under the different regimes 
Cambodians faced over time: traditional Khmer property rights were similar to 
usufruct, where the king appointed persons to use and benefit from a piece of land. 
French colonisation introduced private property rights and individual land ownership 
in Cambodia. After they left, private property was appreciated by the elite but “… 
the Khmer rural masses did not necessarily embrace it” (Simbolon, 2002: 11). 
Later, under the Khmer Rouge regime private property was abolished and peoples’ 
rights to draw benefit from land were transformed to the right to only work on it. A 
vast displacement of the population based on forced resettlement alienated 
Cambodians from traditional claims to their land. However, during the Vietnamese– 
supported People’s Republic of Kampuchea the collectivization of property continued 
as part of a socialist economic model but included different levels of individually 
secured use rights. Restricted private ownership was reintroduced from 1989 on, 
when Cambodia started to transform its socialist system to a market economy 
(Williams, 1999). Constant changes in Cambodian property– related law created a 
legal plurality itself, with traditional and statutory rights co– existing (such as the 
Land Law of 2003, a vast legislation on natural resources together with re– 
acknowledged indigenous, unwritten rights). Degen et al. (2000) find that existing 
rights rather strengthen the powerful than protect the powerless effectively. Today, 
the legal framework is still weak with different components developing at different 
speeds (van Acker, 2003).  
3.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: A SYNOPSIS 
                                                      
 
11 More cautious estimates suggest that around 900.000 people, then one eighth of the country’s 
population, lost their lives during the four years of the Khmer Rouge Regime (Golzio, 2003).  
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Benefits from economic growth have often bypassed the poor. Evidence indicates 
that changes in social and economic processes are necessary to reduce poverty 
(Wolfensohn and Bourguignon, 2004) and that the distribution of benefits from 
growth remains crucial to achieve this goal. In this context, the key role played by 
property rights and collective action in generating well– being, and how to make 
benefits out of property rights and collective action available to the (rural) poor 
remains a challenge for research. To understand how property rights and collective 
action can contribute to poverty reduction, a conceptual framework is guiding the 
case– study in rural Cambodia, building upon the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2005; Oakerson, 1992). This framework 
(Figure 1) separates in a ‘context’ section and ‘action arena’ section.
12  
Figure 1. Conceptual framework on property rights, collective action and 
poverty  
 
Source: Di Gregorio et al., 2008 
The ‘context’ represents initial socio– economic and political conditions 
shaping the opportunities of people for possible actions: (1) the asset base; (2) 
shocks and risks; and (3) political structure of a society. The key problem of lack of 
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assets and weak asset accumulation for the poor highlights the importance of 
enabling property rights, accessible and enforceable for them. The second set of 
conditions refers to the vulnerability of people to fall into poverty and the need to 
create coping mechanisms. Manifested legal structures and power relations 
generally disadvantage the poor. These three factors affect institutions of property 
rights and collective action which are themselves part of the initial context. A major 
part of empirical data from the exploratory study on property rights and collective 
action in rural Cambodia will concentrate on these contextual factors.  
The ‘action arena’ illustrates how individuals, the state, and other actors can 
make use of institutions of property rights and collective action, as well as change 
these institutions to reduce poverty. Nevertheless, not all people have access to 
these institutions or are willing to engage in them. Poor education, exclusion from 
social groups, and landlessness– – as in Cambodia– – are reasons that prevent 
people from engaging. While the context focuses on initial conditions that affect 
peoples’ actions, people’s agency and their interactions with others shape their 
future. Each action situation is shaped by social rules about behavior, use of 
resources, decision– making mechanisms, and, of course, by contextual conditions. 
The actors, their action resources, and applicable rules all delimit the space within 
which actors make choices. Each actor will have different limitations and 
opportunities within different action situations according to contextual conditions 
and to the position of other actors involved. In the action arena, parties act 
independently. They discuss, negotiate, cooperate, and challenge each other.  
Over time, specific actions create stabilized patterns of interaction. They 
refer to regularized and observable behavioural outcomes of actors. In these 
interaction processes, actors reinforce existing institutions or create even new ones. 
Thus, on the one hand, existing institutions delineate the socio– economic space 
within which actors make choices and take action. On the other hand, while 
institutions constrain actions a priori, they may alter institutions ex– post, thus 
changing initial conditions through feedback loops. In a final step patterns of 
interactions lead to outcomes. They can either refer to direct effects on well– being 
(for example, income increases) or to changes in institutions themselves (for 
example, stronger bargaining power of villagers through associations). A number of 
feedback loops might be needed before substantial institutional changes will affect 
the situation of the poor through improved social inclusion, income, health, and 
reduced vulnerability, which can finally serve as evaluative criteria to assess 
outcomes in terms of poverty reduction. 
4.  CAMBODIAN CASE STUDY: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research Objectives 
Based on the problem assessment and the conceptual framework developed, the 
goal of the Cambodian case study is to identify effective practices and policies that 
enhance the way in which cooperation/collective action and property rights are used 
to build up secure assets and income streams for the rural poor. In order to provide 
policy makers, community groups, civil society organizations and researchers with a 
better understanding on the property rights systems in place, the project assesses 
existing property rights systems in rural Cambodia to identify on what benefit  
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streams poor people can rely for their livelihood. The project identifies forms and 
mechanisms of economic and social cooperation, how they influence property rights 
systems, and to what extent rural poor are part of village networks. Based on this 
assessment, the linkages between property rights, collective action, and poverty 
are analyzed. In addition, it explores what resources poor households use, by what 
property rights systems these resources are governed, and if collective action and 
helps poor people to address their needs.  
Methodology 
A mix of methods of empirical research was employed. Interviews and group 
discussions with NGOs, donor agencies, and ministerial staff were used to identify 
research sites. These sites have been selected with regard to different experience 
with formalized institutions for cooperation, the endowment with natural resources, 
and accessibility.
 13 The selected research sites are situated in central Cambodia, in 
the provinces of Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham, both located in the major 
floodplain zones (Figure 2). With support of collaborating organisations, four 
villages have been chosen: Chrang Krohom (CK) and Leuk (LK) in Kampong Thom, 
and Krorsang (KS) and Svay Teap (ST) in Kampong Cham. Villages differ in the 
kinds of resources used, accessibility,
14 income sources, natural resource 
management institutions, and in the degree villages are supported by external 
actors such as NGOs. None of the villages is equipped with electricity or sanitation 
infrastructure but all have access to a school for primary education.
15 Table 1 gives 
an overview of village characteristics as stated above. 
 
                                                      
 
13 Weak physical infrastructure and persisting security problems also influenced site selection. 
14 Accessibility is restricted by temporary isolation during the rainy season, lack of streets for four 
wheeled vehicles, distance to main market places, and poor availability of public transportation. 
15 The village of ST cannot provide education to their villagers currently, as they have established 
a self organized school for which no teacher is available at the moment.  
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Figure 2. Research Sites in Cambodia 
 
Source: Cambodia  Airports, 2007. Phnom Penh International Airport http://www.cambodia–
airports.com/phnompenh/en/cambodia.asp (accessed 2007) 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of Research Sites in Rural Cambodia 
Province Village  Main  income 
source 
















Forest  Subsistence and religious 
customs and services 
Strong 
external 




KS Cash  cropping 
(88.6 %) 





Forest  Subsistence: NTP and 





Lake  Subsistence: fishing, water 
plants harvests 
 




Data collection at the different sites included: (1) semi– structured interviews with 
key informants to gather information on village structure;
16 (2) a household 
survey;
17 (3) group discussions and resource maps to identify changes in the 
resource and to assess property rights of different user groups; and (4) 
experimental evidence to asses trust levels in the villages.
18 Secondary data 
analysis was employed to fill gaps the field research could not address. 
5.  RESEARCH RESULTS 
Household and Village Characteristics 
The household survey compiles data of 146 households in all four villages. At least 
one fifth of each village’s households were included in the survey. All villages are 
similar in their household characteristics. Table 2 gives therefore an overview of 
cross sectional data of these household characteristics. The average size of the 
households interviewed is 6 persons with an average educational level of 1.6 years 
in school. On average, 46.5 percent of the villagers engage in collective action. 
Table 2. Household Survey Overview 
  N Share  Percentage 
Female headed households  146  26  17.8 
Land poor (0 to 1 ha)  146  60  41.1 
Illiteracy rate  146  42  28.8 
Dependence on NR for income generation  146  87  59.6 
 Source: Compiled by authors 
A very large share of the households diversifies its income from more than 
one source. The households also rely on natural resources
19 for livelihood 
generation. Table 3 gives an overview on income diversification in the study sites. 
In Kampong Thom the villages of Chrang Krohom (CK) and Leuk (LK) use 
forest and water resources for subsistence and have been supported by 
international donors and NGOs. At least seven formal associations exist in CK 
offering credit and religious services, natural resource management, and advisory 
services to village authorities.  
                                                      
 
16 This includes data on the villages’ socio– economic background, history, demographics, and 
infrastructure. 
17 The survey contains information on income sources, past and current engagement in collective 
action, participation in village decision making processes, and asset endowments. Households were 
chosen with support of village authorities. The sample was randomly chosen by the researchers based 
on a household list obtained from the village authorities or with the village authorities’ assistance.  
18 Trust games based on Berg et al. (1995) were played in all four villages. 
19 This includes the resources that people use for income generating activities, such as commercial 
fishing. Activities to support livelihoods are also included. The latter are, for example, to collect 




Table 3. Income Diversification 
Village  Share of households 







CK  97.1  Rice cultivation (97.1)  Forest (25.7) 
Cash cropping (91.2)  Water (20.0) 
Fishing (41.0)   
LK  97.2  Rice cultivation (97.1)  Forest (25.7) 
Cash cropping (67.7)  Water (11.4) 
Small businesses (23.0)   
KS  88.1  Rice cultivation (42.9)   Forest (34.3) 
Cash cropping (88.6)  Water (not available) 
Small businesses (22.9)   
ST  74.3  Rice cultivation (78.1)  Forest (51.4) 
Cash cropping (71.9)  Water (37.1) 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
In order to improve forest resource management, village authorities 
established a Community Forest Organization which is already in place but still 
lacks legal recognition. The goal of this forest committee is to protect the local 
forest against overexploitation and, where necessary, to start reforestation. Water 
resources are traditionally managed by the villagers themselves. However, there 
are efforts to further formalize existing water resource management: at the 
moment, the Village Committee
20 manages the resource and take actions when 
problems arise. Water resources management is mainly meant to guarantee 
sufficient water needed for agricultural activity but also intends to keep the fish 
stock at sustainable levels to ensure continuous income generation during the dry 
season. CK has been supported by donor agencies, NGOs, and a Cambodian major 
political party. Agricultural extension services, infrastructure improvement, and 
assistance to establish credit associations have been provided as well as 
proceedings to set up a Community Forest Organization. In contrast to CK, the 
village of LK manages both the communal forest and the local lake commonly by 
the village authorities of the three neighbouring villages that use these resources 
jointly. The forest not only serves as an important resource for income generation 
but also as a social space for religious festivities that are jointly celebrated with 
neighbouring villages.  
Four formal associations are active in LK. They cover credit and religious 
service provision and advise the village authorities. LK received support from donor 
agencies and NGOs for agricultural extension and to establish and develop rice 
banks. Funds are raised to finance common activities to improve infrastructure. In 
Kampong Cham Province the villages of Krorsang (KS) and Svay Teap (ST) have 
been investigated. KS faced a major in– migration, with village population 
increasing by about 50 percent during the last five years. It only depends on forest 
resources for livelihood generation. The local forest is allocated to the commune 
and is hence used by several villages jointly. One association guarantees its 
                                                      
 
20 The Village Committee consists of the village leader, who is appointed by the government, the 
vice village leader and some elderly people that are respected and trusted by most villagers.  
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members’ access to credit. At commune level a Community Forest Organization is 
in place which aims to protect the forest against illegal deforestation and to provide 
subsistence income in particular for poor villagers. KS has been supported by 
national and international NGOs and government programs to establish a 
Community Forest Organization and a credit association, and received support to 
improve its accessibility. In contrast to all other villages, ST only recently started to 
receive governmental support for improving its accessibility. It uses forest and 
water resources that are both managed traditionally by village elders. The forest 
area is also used for religious festivities together with surrounding villages. There is 
one association in ST that was established to support women against domestic 
violence.
21  
Villages thus differ in the way they manage their natural resources and the 
extent to which people act collectively within a village. The following section will 
present more detailed findings on the role of property rights in natural resource 
management at the local level.  
Property Rights, Natural Resource Use, and Cooperation: Processes and 
Actors 
Secured access to land and other natural resources is of major importance for 
sustaining livelihoods in Cambodian rural areas: Rice cultivation and cash cropping 
(such as soybean, yam) are the main income sources to the rural population. 
Natural resources are mainly used by the rural poor to complement their small 
income. Therefore, this section will focus on access and use of natural resources 
first and then will give an overview about the impacts of resulting conflicts on 
people’s livelihoods. 
Natural resources such as forests and lakes, ponds and other water units are, 
as the Land Law (2001) states, owned by the state either as “public” or “private” 
state domain. Privatization of these resources is endorsed by the Land Law under 
very restricted conditions only (Kirk, 2004). Complementary to property rights 
legislation, resource management is regulated in different laws, decrees, and 
regulations. It is executed by different government departments on provincial and 
district levels.
22 In all four villages (illegal) conversion of natural resources has been 
detected.
23 Natural resources in Cambodia are in fact already degraded, with most 
conversions starting around 1979 during the Pol Pot regime or right after its end.
24 
A relatively new tool to address forest resource degradation are Community Forests 
                                                      
 
21 This association is actually not working. It was established externally by the Commune Council 
with insufficient training on the purpose and tasks of this association. The association leader could 
only vaguely describe the purpose of the association. 
22 Cambodia is administratively divided into provinces, which, in turn, consist of several districts. A 
district combines several communes which consist of a number of villages being the smallest 
administrative entity. 
23 There are, for example, activities to fill up lakes to grow more rice or to clear remaining forests 
for cropping purpose. 
24 One exception is KS, where clearing began only recently in 2000 with immigration and 
completely changed traditional pattern of fallow cropping systems, where the forest was cleared for 




25 that have been introduced by the RGC to hand over 
resource rights to local people and to initiate sustainable natural resource 
management. These new tools have been established or are being set up in two of 
the villages whereas the other two still manage their resources traditionally. 
According to the Law, each village can decide whether it wants to apply for a 
formalized community or not. The establishment of these organizations depends on 
whether legal knowledge of the existence of Community Forests or Fishery 
Communes was disseminated, whether human and financial resources are available 
in the villages, and whether the communes go through the registration process.
26 In 
addition, it depends on whether the resource is part of a natural reserve or an 
economic concession.
27 At the research sites where local authorities chose to set up 
Fishery Community or Community Forest Organizations the problems that arise 
during implementation are similar: (1) procedures to register the Community 
Organizations, as stated by members involved in the establishment of the 
Organizations, are very time consuming and impossible to be monitored by the 
applying villages or communes; (2) uncertainties exist about community boundaries 
that have to be jointly identified, clarified, and settled before the registration can be 
finalized; and (3) cooperation with other villages or communes is rather low and 
makes it difficult to include all user groups. As a result of these dimensions, no 
clear responsibilities exist during the time span between the application for and the 
finalization of the registration process for the Fishery Community or Community 
Forest Organizations. As a consequence, administration officers sometimes stop the 
ongoing processes arbitrarily on inspection tours leaving community members in 
uncertainty whether they are allowed to enforce not yet officially approved rules.  
The villages of KS and CK decided to establish Community Organizations for 
natural resource management. In KS forest resources are rapidly decreasing even 
though a Community Forest Organization is in place. First clearings were done or 
tacitly protected by higher ranking people from the military being in clandestine 
contact with some villagers. Villagers opposing logging and tree cutting activities 
were threatened, even with arms. These patterns of pushing deforestation by mere 
force are still widely spread in rural Cambodia (see the AHRCHK website for 
reported cases
28). The cleared land has then been sold to immigrants, resulting in a 
remarkable population increase of more than 50 percent in the village during the 
last five years. In 2003, the village authorities of KS established a Community 
Forest Organization, but registration was finalized only in 2006. During the three 
                                                      
 
25The Forestry Law states the possibility for local groups to manage their forests: “Community 
Forest means an area of state forest granted under an agreement to manage and utilize the forest in a 
sustainable manner between the Forest Administration and a local community or organized group of 
people living within or near the forest area and depend upon it for subsistence and traditional use” 
(Forestry Law, 2002: Article 5/8). These local user groups are often simply named Forest Community.  
26 Registering processes are time consuming and require a certain degree of literacy in order to be 
able to negotiate with the provincial forest or fisheries administrations. They also consume significant 
financial resources as transportation to the provincial capital is necessary as well as to the resource 
site for demarcation.  
27 In the latter cases the registration processes will depend on external support as different laws 
and ministries are involved, and complex legal knowledge is needed to be successful in the negotiating 
processes. 
28 Asian Human Rights Commission: www.ahrchk.net   
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years of unclear responsibilities to protect the forest against illegal logging, around 
fifty new houses were built within the area of the Community Forest Organization, 
and large parts of the local forests had already been turned into farmland. Clearings 
took place even though it was well known to all parties involved that damaging the 
forest resource was forbidden and the Community Forest area had already been 
provisionally marked as a protected area by the Community Forest Organization. 
During the registration process, migrants
29 who settled down within the forest 
turned it into agricultural and homestead land. These settlements hindered the 
original villagers
30 from continuing traditional fallow cropping. It further aggravated 
the existing pressure on local resources.
31 The ever– shrinking forest units 
continued to be of major importance to the original villagers as they rely on them 
for income generation. Even though the Community Forest Organization 
immediately reports to the local forest administration whenever rules are broken,
32 
no impact on halting logging or the conversion of forests to agricultural land is 
observable.
33 Settling down in the Community Forest area remains unpunished for 
reasons that could not completely be assessed during the research. KS is also 
unable to cooperate with other villages that also heavily rely on the forest. KS 
authorities feel unable to inhibit the other villages’ inhabitants to (ab–)use forest 
lands or to migrate to the Community Forest Organization area. As Community 
Forest Organization members point out, punishment of intruders is the right of the 
intruders’ “home” authorities. In addition, newly settled villagers invite their kin and 
neighbours from their villages of origin to KS as their experience acquiring land 
through converting forests to arable land had been positive and assuming that 
there would still be more land available to be distributed by local authorities. This 
indicates that newcomers expect not to be punished for converting forests into 
arable land in the short run.
34 As a result, KS is still unable to keep migrants from 
settling within the forest and is still unable to prevent anyone from logging. As a 
consequence, the Community Forest Organization fails to protect its forest and to 
shift to a more sustainable forestry system.  
                                                      
 
29 The term migrants here refers to people coming from neighbouring villages and communes as 
well as to people from other districts and provinces. 
30 The original villagers are understood as households that have been living in KS ever since they 
have been born and are still familiar with fallow cropping traditions.  
31 The forest faced severe degradation already before migrants came to settle down as, due to 
population growth, some parts of the forest already were transformed for cash cropping purposes. 
Additionally, the military logged precious woods out of the dense forest leaving a disrupted eco– 
system. 
32 Only the Forest Administration is able to arrest people or secure evidence to punish crimes 
against Forestry Law. 
33 This is due to a time lag from the time logging is reported to the time the forest administration 
officers can react to it. The time lag is relatively big and might take few days, as telecommunication 
services are costly and not readily available in rural Cambodia. Furthermore, there are only few 
officers that are responsible for sometimes hardly accessible areas. 
34 In this context, the work of Community Forest Organization is further complicated if user groups 
are actively in– migrating from other communes or districts, as neither community members nor local 




In CK the institutional settings offered under the new legislation also fail to 
achieve the goal of preserving forest resources. Here too, the main threat to forest 
areas is the conversion into agricultural land.
35 However, in contrast to KS, this 
conversion is not due to in– migration but a direct consequence of the scarcity of 
arable land in the village. During the last two years floods destroyed parts of the 
rice harvest in the village, encouraging people to look for new fields in locations 
that are less flood– prone and more reliable to generate sufficient income sources. 
Experiencing higher returns on the crops grown in the former forest area, more and 
more villagers put an effort to get access to parcels of this fertile land. Local 
villagers thus started with slash and burn agriculture and over time shifted 
agricultural activities from rice to cash cropping. However, some differentiation is 
necessary as poor people are not even able to invest time in slash and burn 
activities while still crucially depending on forest products.
36 They spend ever more 
time to generate the minimum amount needed for subsistence that was provided 
easily by the products from the forests in the past. The benefit streams out of the 
forest decrease the more the resource is getting scarcer. The study found people in 
CK relying mainly on forest products for livelihood generation to be the only ones 
whose well– being deteriorated over the last five years. In order to address the 
issue of deteriorating forest resources, local authorities decided to apply for a 
Community Forest Organization
37 in order to preserve the remaining forest in the 
area. As in KS, the Community Forest Organization in CK suffers from a lack of 
responsibility and from unclear local boundaries. In addition, authorities fail to 
cooperate with neighbouring villages using the same forest. 
All facts together, in turn, result in an institutional situation that does not 
allow communities to effectively exclude anyone from extracting goods out of the 
natural resource base or to convert forest resources into arable land. Villagers often 
formulated access rules as “first come, first served” rules for their natural 
resources.
38 Even in cases when user communities have already been established 
and are setting rules, only rare events can be traced back in which trespassers 
have been detected. Even rarer events could be identified in which they were held 
responsible for their actions. Altogether, the institutional setting is getting close to 
an open access situation. 
This rather disappointing sketch of the current situation, however, does not 
preclude the continued operation of traditional mechanisms in Cambodia to manage 
common natural resources effectively at a local level. In all of the four villages 
there have been traditional resource management institutions in place historically. 
However, in KS and CK villages indigenous responsibility has been handed over to 
an institution that replaces traditional mechanisms. Cambodian traditional natural 
resource management mechanisms also aim to achieve a sustainable use of natural 
                                                      
 
35 Large parts of the forest are already used for cash cropping (corn, cashew, and mango 
cultivation) and as rice fields. 
36 Poor people are not able to invest time in slash and burn activities as they cannot rely on 
savings while at the same time being strongly dependent on income streams on a daily basis. 
Investing in land conversion takes too much time until these activities will be turned into income. 
37 Until June 2007 the registration process was not finished. 




39 elaborate solutions to resource threats and develop, 
revitalize, and try to enforce sets of rules that aim to overcome arising problems.
40 
Traditional management also results in regular common activities such as lake 
excavations or dam building and maintenance, where all villagers are asked and 
expected to take part. Religious tradition is another norm and rule creating and 
enforcing mechanism that brings people together to prepare for festivities, allocate 
sacred sites, set up or renovate temporary huts, and clear the forest from shrub.  
Once a rule is set, it applies for the villagers as well as for any outsider. 
Trespassers, when caught, are explained the rules as well as the reasons why the 
rule has been applied. The monitoring of compliance with the rules is done by all 
villagers, while the village leader is expected to take action if trespasser does not 
refrain from breaking these local rules. Action means mainly to report the incidents 
to the commune council or to the authorities responsible to sue the trespasser. 
There are no further enforcement mechanisms in place, resulting in a number of 
trespassers that do not abide by the rules.
41 However, the respect for village elders 
and religious beliefs
42 hinder most local people from breaking formulated rules. The 
villages LK and ST manage their resources only based on traditional, endogenous 
rules and enforcement mechanisms. The villages have a traceable history in 
cooperation, as they traditionally cultivate rice and are thus dependent on support 
from fellow villagers, for example, to transplant rice seedlings and for animal 
traction. Buddhist festivities bring people of surrounding villages together in the 
forest area to celebrate. Village authorities respond to changes in the resource base 
and in cases when problems occur. On all lands surrounding the villages, people 
have access rights to extract products for subsistence, no matter whether the land 
is privately or commonly owned.
43 In LK rules are in place to limit extraction rates 
that aim to keep the forest at its current size. Plans are underway to even increase 
the quality of the resource base: an enlargement of the local pond is planned to 
contribute additional income for subsistence through fishing. In ST local rules 
prohibit the use of certain fishing gear and the conversion of forests into arable 
land. Villagers act collectively to protect their resource base,
44 when resources are 
used as common property.  
These examples describe different setups for natural resource management 
institutions and property rights enforcement mechanisms, and their different 
                                                      
 
39 This comprises mostly village leaders, respected village elders, and religious authorities. 
40 Reacting to decreased fish stock, for example, they may set up rules listing exactly the kind of 
fishing equipment that is allowed to be used or must not be used in a local lake. Another response 
may be to ban harvesting bamboo for house construction when bamboo forests are threatened by 
overuse. 
41 This is especially true for water resources where illegal fishing gear, such as explosives, will 
threaten the resource base. 
42 Strong beliefs exist that a person disrupting “Neak Ta”, the forest spirits, will suffer from ill 
health or bad harvests. 
43 Collecting fuel wood, catching crabs in rice fields, etc. are allowed as long as these activities do 
not affect the harvest. After harvesting, the fields usually become common grazing grounds for 
livestock. 
44 These activities include cutting shrub in the forest and the excavation of the lake to keep it from 
being overgrown.  
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outcomes. LK and ST are still traditionally managed, whereas CK and KS 
established newly offered external institutions (Fishery Communities and 
Community Forests) trying to make traditional use rights legally enforceable. 
Nevertheless, all village authorities feel vulnerable to interventions of higher 
ranking authorities. They feel unable to oppose plans interfering with their local 
management strategies, leaving formalized and traditional institutions vulnerable to 
external intervention and thus undermining the authorities’ ability to enforce rules 
at local level. 
As agriculture remains the main income source in Cambodian rural areas, 
scarce arable land resources, together with rapid population growth, put increasing 
pressure on natural resources as many farmers seek to transform so– called 
unproductive land
45 to add to their existing land holdings. As laws, decrees, and 
other legal texts set different prerequisites and incentives to establish private 
property rights and have been implemented and communicated to the local 
population incompletely, conflicts arise for common pool resources.
46 These 
conflicts have different impacts on people’s livelihoods depending on the size of the 
land and the actors involved.  
In the absence of cadastral records, land is often assumed to be state owned 
and is sold at a large scale without consulting local level administration about 
current uses, correct location, and spatial expansion (Zimmermann and Kruk, 
2002; Bliss, 2005). This gives space for unrestricted speculation often involving 
government officials, the military and Khmer, or expatriate businessmen. But 
villagers are also often unaware of state laws. This, in turn, causes conflicts 
between villagers and government bodies at all administrative levels. It is often not 
known by the villagers that natural resources are owned by the state and must not 
be converted to arable land.  
The most severe consequence is a loss of these resources as a productive 
asset for the household or the village community as a whole. Such a loss might be 
temporary and only last as long as the conflict is resolved. However, it might also 
result in a complete loss of land as a productive asset due to decisions by local 
authorities, courts, or the exertion of power by local elites (such as forests 
converted into rubber plantations). In addition, conflict resolution processes tie up 
labor force and often substantial financial assets.
47  
Conflicts over natural resources can usually only be solved at a district, 
provincial, or even the national level. Local villagers on their own are often unable 
to enforce their rights to a particular resource. Nevertheless, as usually quite a 
number of local resource users are affected by a conflict, they are able to pool 
resources and can lobby their local authorities or civil society organisations to take 
action on their behalf. Collective action might help to overcome not only natural 
                                                      
 
45 Land is often left unused when the household that owns the land lacks capital, labor force (for 
example, through illness or temporary migration) or seeds for planting in time. Forested land is also 
considered unproductive, once valuable woods have been logged. 
46 There are conflicts about agricultural and homestead lands too, but the focus here will be on 
other natural resources.  
47 Costs of conflict resolution include fees for administration and transportation costs. Both usually 
rise when conflict resolution is solved at higher administrative levels. In addition, conflicts also affect 
parties’ self esteem and threaten their physical well– being when they turn violent.  
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resource management problems but also be of importance to enforce rights on 
benefit streams out of the resources against. In the following section forms of 
collective action in rural Cambodia will be identified and factors that influence 
engagement in collective action will be analyzed.  
 
Collective Action in Rural Cambodia 
 
Even after the Pol Pot terror regime and civil war, people in Cambodia continue to 
cooperate in many ways, ranging from agricultural activities such as transplanting 
rice, to building social infrastructure such as schools, to membership in other 
associations, not necessarily with an economic focus. In all four villages a wide 
range of activities was identified in which collective action is practiced as an effort 
to improve rural livelihoods and deliver local goods with a public character.
48 In this 
study a broad definition is used to identify collective action. It is understood as the 
voluntary engagement of a group of people to reach a common goal. Villagers plan 
for and execute activities that serve not only the household but also a group of 
people or the village as a whole.
49 
Figure 3 gives a first overview about the different domains of collective action 
and the frequency of help that is given to fellow villagers as percent of households 
engaging in the different activities. Patterns of help in the villages go beyond lines 
of kinship especially in cases where help is needed due to illness, funerals, and for 
communal work. Help for house construction or field work rather follows lines of 
affinity but still goes beyond the extended family.  
                                                      
 
48Activities include spontaneous help after a house burns down (to build a shelter and provide 
clothes), over bilateral livestock sharing arrangements (animal traction for ploughing), and informal 
natural resource management, up to more formalized associations with written rules and 
constitutions. 
49Examples are road construction, building schools, transplanting rice, and contribututions for 









Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Although a wide range of collective action issues could be identified, quite 
different factors influence an individual’s readiness to provide for activities that are 
of common interest. These differences are due to household variables as well as 
village characteristics. All villages investigated planned for and executed common 
activities that serve not only the household itself but the village as a whole, for 
example through road construction. Cross sectional data from the 2005 survey 
gives some insights on what particular household characteristics influence a 
household’s decision to take part in collective action. Based on the results of the 
measures of association, a binary logistic regression was employed with the aim to 
analyze what characteristics (village or household related) are likely to increase the 
household’s participation in collective action. The dependent variable is 
dichotomous: it is 1 if the household takes part in collective action, and 0 if it does 
not. An overview of the regression results is given in Table 4. The Classification 
Table highlights that the model successfully predicts 88.4 percent of the cases, that 
is if a household participates in community work or not. Under “Model Summary,” 
we see that the – 2 Log Likelihood statistic is 89.55. This statistic measures how 
the model predicts the decisions – the smaller the statistic, the better the model. 
Cox and Snell R
2 can be interpreted like the R
2 in a multiple regression, but cannot 
reach a maximum value of 1. The “Variables in the Regression” Table presents 
regression coefficients and odds ratios. B gives the natural logarithm of the odds 
ratio, and Exp(B) represents the predicted odds ratio for each variable. The Wald 
statistic tests the unique contribution of each predictor, holding the other predictors 
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Table 4. Binary logistic regression on participation in common activities 




Participation in work for 




Participation in work for the 
community 
no 19  12  61,290 
yes  5 110  95,652 
Overall Percentage        88,356 
             
Omnibus Test  Chi²: 61.417  df: 18       
Model summary 
– 2 Log– 
Likelihood: 89.55  Cox and Snell R²: 0.343       
                
Variables in the regression  B S.E. Wald  p  Exp(B) 
Households size  0.179  0.205  7.576  0.004  1.195 
Number of children  0.600  0.328  3.349  0.067  1.822 
Years lived in the village  – 
0.033 
0.038 0.777  0.378  0.967 
Education – 
0.081 
0.118 0.466  0.495  0.923 
Expected engagement in 
village institutions 
0.353 0.488  0.523  0.470  1.423 
Influence on decision making  0.631  0.684  0.852  0.036  0.532 




0.915 0.436  0.509  0.547 
Participation in village 
meetings 
1.440 1.640  0.771  0.380  4.221 
Knowledge of conflict 
resolution mechanisms 
0.639 0.688  0.863  0.353  1.895 
Conflict occurrence  – 
0.898 
0.842 1.139  0.286  0.407 
Knowledge of local rules  0.800  0.795  1.012  0.314  2.225 
Wealth – 
0.998 
0.472 4.473  0.034  0.369 
General engagement in social 
activities 
2.594 2.040  1.617  0.204  13.383 
Market access  – 
2.862 
0.814 12.353  0.000  0.057 
Village institutions  2.011  0.897  10.175  0.001  7.477 




0.468 1.315  0.251  0.584 
Access to information on 
village affairs 
1.211 0.659  3.373  0.066  3.357 
Constant – 
1.709 
2.347 0.530  0.467  0.181 




They can be interpreted as follows: If Exp(B)>1, the explaining variable 
increases the probability of a household to switch to “yes”, meaning to take part in 
common activities; if Exp(B)<1, the explaining variable increases the probability of 
an individual’s “no”, meaning no engagement in common activities.
50  
As the sample size is relatively small, the prediction quality is low. Still, 
important insights can be derived. The household size and access to information on 
village matters increase the probability of participation in village activities, whereas 
an increase in wealth adds to the probability of not taking part in common 
activities. This is consistent with the observation that the wealthy buy themselves 
out from obligatory community work by hiring poorer villagers to do their part in 
the required activities. Village characteristics that have been included do have an 
impact on the probability that a household will take part in common activities: 
households in a village with traditional institutions have higher probability of acting 
collectively, whereas village market access significantly lowers a household’s 
probability to take part in collective action. On the one hand, villages with better 
market access are also more accessible to government agencies and NGOs whose 
activities in the villages might crowd out collective action as they often employ 
villagers to build up common goods.
51  
On the other hand, as main elements of collective action in rural Cambodia 
are concerned with road construction and accessibility to the village in general, 
villages with good market access might not need as much effort to maintain 
physical infrastructure compared to villages with poor accessibility. Only very small 
and non– significant effects were found for the other explanatory variables: the 
longer a household lives in the village (variable ‘years lived in the village’), the 
more it will be willing to engage in collective action. Households that expect to get 
more involved in village institutions also contribute more. People attending village 
meetings, having higher knowledge on local rules, and generally behaving pro– 
social have a higher chance to take part in collective action. Variables that increase 
the probability of not taking part in common activities are ‘years of migration’ (the 
time a household spends outside the village), ‘education,’ and ‘power to influence 
village decision making processes’. Again, the latter findings are not significant and 
thus hard to interpret. 
In order to paint a more detailed picture of the results, some simple 
association measures are presented in table 5. It shows the strength of association 
between household’s characteristics and the household’s engagement in common 
activities as Cramer’s V coefficient
52 for the strongest associations.  
 
                                                      
 
50 Exp(B) is interpreted as an odds ratio for main effects model. 
51 The RGC program SEILA, for example, employs villagers to build and maintain streets. This is 
paid labor and is not considered collective action in this context. 
52 The Cramer’s V coefficient measures the strength of association of categorical variables, ranging 
from 0, no association, to 1, perfect association. The closer Cramer’s V is to 1, the stronger is the 
association between the variables. In the literature, values between 0.1 and 0.2 indicates a weak 
association, and values between 0.2 and 0.4 indicates a moderate association (Rea and Parker, 1992). 








Years in the 
village 
Participation in village 






Years in the 
village 
0.495 0.320  0.317  0.260 
Source: Compiled by authors 
The strongest association was found for the variable ‘years spent in the 
village’. The longer a household lives in a village the longer the household receives 
benefits from public goods provided by its fellow villagers: social ties improve and 
commitment to the village increases. People taking part in village meetings might 
be more committed to the village and thus inclined to take part in collective action 
on the village level. But the meetings themselves may help motivate people 
because development projects are announced in the meetings, and financial needs 
and labor requirements discussed. The variable ‘household size’ shows strong 
association with participation in communal work. A larger household is better able 
to spare a member from household activities to participate in collective projects.
53 
Smaller households’ participation in common activities can be costly, especially if 
the household depends on daily wage labor and cannot afford to take part in 
collective action that generates no direct payoffs. 
Simple correlations (Table 6) also indicate that landless and land– poor 
households are less likely to engage in formalized institutions for collective action 
such as cash associations or rice banks. The same is true for less educated 
households. 
Table 6. Strength of association: landless and land poor 
households’ engagement in formalized associations  
Household’s 
Characteristics 
Association membership  Education (years in 
school) 
Cramer’s V  0.619  0.375 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Table 7 illustrates that less educated households are less likely to engage in 
associations. It plots the shares for each category of school education against the 
fact whether households expect to engage at less, the same or more associations. 
In the research sites 56.8 percent of the illiterate households and 57.1 percent of 
the households with one to three years schooling expect to become more engaged 
in associations, whereas 72.7 and 62.5 percent of the higher educated households 
expect more engagement. Illiterate or poorer people frequently feel themselves as 
”only ordinary villagers“ who are not worth taking part in associations, unless they 
are explicitly invited by association leaders. Most of the reasons not to become a 
member of an association are mistrust and a lack of confidence. People often do not 
take part when association leaders support a political party or belong to an informal 
                                                      
 




network of kinship and affinity that is different from the one with which the 
potential member is affiliated.
54  
 





Years of Schooling of Household Head (HH) 
Illiterate 
 
1– 3 years 
schooling 
3– 6 years 
schooling 














1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Same level  8.1  14.3  9.1  25.0 
More  56.8  57.1  72.7  62.5 
No information 
on association  33.8  28.6  18.2  12.5 
Total    100.0  100.0  100.0.  100.0 
Source: Compiled by authors 
In addition, landless and land– poor villagers are afraid their financial assets 
would not be sufficient to pay back loans when becoming members of cash 
associations or rice banks, or to pay regular membership fees. It is people owning 
middle– sized land parcels who are strongly engaged in these associations (Table 
8). They are also more likely to engage in more than one association, establishing 
more complex networks through cooperation with a stronger impact on local well– 
being. Every second household owning more than 4 hectares of land does not take 
part in any association. There are two reasons to opt out. First, people with large 
land holdings are not dependent on rice banks or cash associations. Their harvests 
guarantee enough income for consumption as well as for investments to crop in the 
next season. The second reason would be time restrictions. Agricultural activities 
are labor intense and time consuming. The larger the land holdings of a household, 
the more time members of that household spend with field work. The households 
will especially opt out, when association membership means engaging in time 
consuming activities (guarding natural resources, for example).  
 
  
                                                      
 
54 In rural Cambodia, the main political parties are present with an office or a representative in 
nearly each village.  
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Table 8. Land ownership and membership in associations 
  Land ownership (in percent) 
< 1 ha  1 to 4 ha  > 4 ha 
Association 
membership 
No member in 
any association 
 
36.6 34.0 50.0 
Member in one 
association 
51.2 53.8 12.5 
 
Member in more 
than one 
association 
12.2 30.2 37.5 
Total     100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
However, there are exceptions. Empirical research in KS village shows that 
low engagement of middle– sized land owners in associations is due to a large 
number of immigrants; these purchase middle– sized land pieces without 
integrating completely into the village (Table 9). As immigrants contribute to an 
ever increasing share of the total village population, they can be expected to 
establish their own associations in the future. In the village of ST no association is 
operating, even though a women’s association formally exists.
55  
 
Table 9. KS village: In– migration and association membership 
  Born in the 
village 
Living in the village 
more than 5 years  
Living in the village 
less than 5 years 
 (in  percent) 
No membership in any 
association 
6.0 4.0  28.0 
Membership in at least 
one association 
42.0 12.0  8.0 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Households with a low human capital base are less likely to shape their 
livelihoods by taking part in collective decision making processes. Though they do 
take part in collective action, less educated people will not feel free to participate if 
they are not explicitly included by authorities due to their low self– confidence. The 
same is true for poorer people. They will not take part in decision– making 
processes unless local authorities include them. Table 10 illustrates a strong 
positive correlation of educational level, wealth, and power to influence village 
decision– making. Nevertheless, contentedness with decisions made for the village 
is evenly distributed among all households.  
 
                                                      
 
55 The association leader assures that all women are members; however, the women are neither 
aware of being members nor is the association leader able to indicate purpose and activities of the 
association in question.  
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Power to influence 
village decisions 
Pearson’s Correlation   1.000  0.259**  0.184* 
Significance (two sided)    0.002  0.027 
N 146  146  146 
Years in School  Pearson’s Correlation  0.259**  1.000  0.400** 
Significance (two sided)  0.002     0,000 
N 146  146  146 
Wealth Pearson’s  Correlation  0.184*  0.400**  1.000 
Significance (two sided)  0.027  0.000   
N 146  146  146 
Source: Compiled by authors 
* significant at 0.05 percent level, ** significant at 0.01 percent level 
 
As described above, poorer and less educated households reported not 
feeling capable to take part in decision making processes or to engage in formal 
institutions. Often, a certain portion of mistrust also keeps Cambodians from 
engaging in these activities. In order to substantiate these results from descriptive 
data analysis, economic field experiments on trust have been conducted in the 
villages.
56 The experiment’s results are shown in Table 11. People in all villages 
trusted their fellow villagers to some degree (as indicated by the fractions sent). 
People’s trustworthiness (represented in the fractions returned) is low, and return 
ratios
57 vary across villages.  
 







CK  0.15 0.1592  1.41667 
LK  0.546875 0.2856  1.54688 
KS  0.23611 0.1282  1.0 
ST  0.403846 0.1247  0.77273 
Average all villages  0.33421 0.1744  1,18407 
Source: Compiled by authors 
Post–game interviews indicate that higher levels of fractions sent might be 
due to religious attitudes of solidarity as most individuals state fairness or fear of 
punishment being the main reasons to send an amount of money.
58 Only few 
                                                      
 
56 A detailed description of the game is given in the Annex.  
57 The return ratio is calculated as share of the amount sent back by player B and the amount sent 
by player A (players A who sent 0 are not included as division by 0 is not defined). Return ratios 
smaller than 1.0 indicate that people who trusted their fellow villagers with money did lose part of the 
amount they sent. Return ratios higher than 1.0 show that players of group B share the surplus 
received through the design of the game. 
58 This might be due to religious beliefs of punishment in the following life but might also be out of 
fear that their behavior will come to light after the game (torture during the Khmer rouge regime  
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respondents mentioned the opportunity of extra gain as their predominant intention 
to send money to their counterparts. These attitudes would be expected to lead to 
similar levels in the fractions returned, as religious attitudes of solidarity or fear of 
punishment would also apply for players who return. Again, the post– game 
questionnaire sheds some light on the reasons behind the lack of reciprocity. People 
who did not or only returned small fractions assumed their counterparts to be 
wealthier and thus take the amount received as a gift. Religious attitudes have not 
been controlled for, as all participants are Buddhist.  
On an individual level, the household size has a significant negative impact 
on the individual’s trust level, meaning individuals living in large families tended to 
send less to their counterparts than smaller households.
59 Looking at the research 
villages separately, CK shows lowest and LK the highest trust levels. In CK trust 
level decreases the more common activities an individual joined during a year’s 
time span. This is due to the fact that most common activities
60 to improve local 
physical infrastructure are still perceived as forced labor.
61 It is noteworthy that in 
both villages with formal Community Forest or Fishery Community Organizations 
(CK, KS) trust is lower than in the two traditionally managed villages (LK, ST). The 
measure of the strength of association between an individual’s trust level and 
traditional village institutions (Cramer’s V) takes the value of 0.536. 
6.  DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
In all villages, natural resource degradation is observable and negatively affects the 
rural poor. Van Acker (1999) and others (World Bank, 2003b) already noted that 
resource degradation is severe, expecting a “total harvest approach” (van Acker, 
1999; 5). Incomplete regulation and, in particular, weak enforcement mechanisms 
at all levels of jurisdictions were the major causes of resource degradation 
identified by Hach and Sothea (2004). In addition, traditional succession schemes
62 
together with high population growth put a significant pressure on the state of 
natural resources. The RGC tries to address resource degradation through 
Community Forest and Fishery Community Organizations. However, these 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
included the threat that the Angka knows everything and would find out each and every lie). Another 
explanation might be recent history of forced collectivisation, where villagers were forced to contribute 
to common goals whereas free– riding has not been punished (Colletta and Cullen, 2000). 
59 Excess bonding social capital can be responsible for exclusive, sealing– off networks (Putnam, 
1995); in the case of excess bonding capital, the extended household acts as the social network that 
is more capable to exclude outsiders the bigger it is. Bigger households are thus better able to rely on 
their members such as for child care, borrowing money, or help for field activities. Smaller households 
are, on the other hand, much more dependent on bridging social capital to support their livelihoods. 
60The term “common activities” is used here to differentiate it from the voluntary collective action 
discussed earlier.  
61 In the 2005 household survey only 9.7 percent of the interviewed reported to take part in 
common activities on a voluntary basis in CK. In the other villages an average of 85.47 percent of the 
individuals reported to work voluntarily for the village. 
62 Traditionally, the children “inherit” part of their parents land when they get married to start 
their own household. With high population growth the sizes of the land plots that young couples are 
getting are smaller and are often not sufficient to sustain the family. Thus, new strips of land are 
cleared to generate sufficient income.   
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approaches face several obstacles. Slow registering processes lead to uncertainties 
on how to apply rules for Community Organizations. Most of the areas that are still 
forested land are difficult to assess, thus complicating an exact definition of 
boundaries of the resource unit. As the forest administration is reported to lack 
sufficient human and financial resources, it is unable to react timely and effectively 
to requests of the communes (EIC, 2005). Calavan et al. (2004) and van Acker 
(1999) find corruption as one of the factors that slows down the registration 
process
63 at the local level.
64  
Low cooperation between villages leaves communities unable to enforce rules 
set for a resource used by different villages. This might be due to low levels of trust 
observed in the villages during field experiments in 2006.
65 Different studies (such 
as Colletta and Cullen, 2000; Pellini and Ayres, 2005) find that bridging and linking 
social capital is rather low in Cambodia. Following Uphoff’s (2000) definition of trust 
as “essential ‘glue’ of society” (2000:227), trust is necessary to build up and 
sustain long term cooperation. Given the low degrees of trust found in the villages 
of this case study (and especially in those with Community Forest and Fishery 
Community Organisations), it can be assumed that if villagers that do not even 
consider their fellow villagers trustworthy, they would be even less likely to trust 
from neighbouring villages. Observed differences in the ability to coordinate within 
the village (as opposed to among villages) can be attributed partly to a strict top– 
down leadership. It would also be an important issue for further research to 
investigate if religion influences attitudes and what kind of religious attitudes 
influence in turn the differences in trust and trustworthiness among the Cambodian 
rural population. Another reason for unsuccessful natural resource management can 
be attributed to the lack of trust hindering people to cooperate in order to protect 
the resource. In a cross– country study Zak and Knack (2001) find low trust levels 
in countries were political environments are unstable and social heterogeneity is 
high. Experimental evidence from the villages shows lower levels of trust in those 
villages where authorities chose to establish new property rights– related 
institutions. In fact, there is a strong positive association of an individual’s trust 
level with traditional village institutions 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In rural Cambodia property rights on natural resources such as local forests, fish 
ponds, lakes, water streams, or harvested fields are normally commonly owned, 
used, and managed. This makes effective collective action a precondition for 
sustainable resource management as well as income generation and asset built– up 
for the rural poor. For a country which has been disrupted for decades by war, 
genocide, and forced collectivization and is still characterized by fragile or even 
                                                      
 
63 Commonly reported corruption techniques include demands of administrative staff for extra 
payments for “express services” (to speed up administrative processes) or gasoline expenditures for 
staff that need to travel to the villages.  
64 At a larger scale, Global Witness (2007) reported corruption to be a major obstacle for 
sustainable resource management throughout Cambodia. 
65 There is some experimental evidence that people in CK are less trustful than villagers in the 
other villages.  
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weak government institutions putting pressure on the rule of law, legal security, 
and human rights enforcement, it is not surprising that both property rights 
systems and collective action do not yet fulfil the requirements and expectations 
given to them either by research, civil society organisations, or donors. 
The ongoing devolution process for natural resources in Cambodia might be 
considered as premature and short– sighted for its immediate impact on collective 
action and can even inhibit or even undermine expected sustainable use patterns. 
Under current devolution policies, important monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms executed by a still weak, though existent local forest administration 
are removed abruptly after responsibility for resource management is handed over 
to local Community Forest or Fishery Community Organizations. Yet these 
communities are neither officially acknowledged by the government nor able to 
execute the whole spectrum of responsibilities assigned to them. The result is that 
an institutional vacuum emerges, which does not favor of the poor.  
For formal institutions to be efficient to manage the local commons, the 
concrete procedures and sequencing to formulate and enforce by– laws and 
statutes integrating both guiding principles of a devolving state and traditional local 
rules and enforcement mechanisms should be given more consideration. 
Uncertainties on the part of both the government and the local user groups will 
have to be diminished. An important first step will be to reduce existing 
uncertainties about village or commune boundaries, responsibilities, and procedures 
to be taken in case of violation of rules. However, it will only be successful if 
different line agencies, such as a decentralized Ministry of Land or Ministry of 
Agriculture, responsible for Forestry and Fishery, support villagers in identifying 
their boundaries, demarcating them and documenting the results in a joint effort. 
Enforcement will only work at the interface of old established informal and newly 
developed formal institutions if administrative procedures are transparent regarding 
how to fine violators of common property rules: to what degree can peer pressure 
be applied, how to coordinate enforcement not only within but between villages, 
and when to hand over power of decision making to the judiciary.  
An immediate removal of tasks and power to monitor and enforce sustainable 
resource use from line ministries and other state agencies to local users cannot be 
accomplished overnight in a country that is ridden by mistrust, forced settlement in 
the villages, and a long period of interrupting the development of social cohesion 
and capital. In addition to the local users’ efforts to enforce rights, those ministries 
should not remove their officers from their responsibilities but rather define their 
tasks newly as to cooperate and support local Community Organizations. 
In particular for the rural poor any participation in organisations to foster 
collective action and to govern the commons is quite costly: activities are time 
consuming, direct compensation cannot be expected, and unbalanced reciprocity 
has often not yet been proved to work for them. Although the poor in rural 
Cambodia might profit most from protecting their local commons, they are not 
necessarily the ones able to defend their own interests effectively within village 
organizations. The poor remain dependent on the more affluent in the villages to 
initiate and continue cooperation to protect their interests. As the poor are often 
those with no formal education and a weak human capital base, and without or with 
very little land, they are less likely to get involved in formalized groups which have 
been mainly externally established to support agricultural activities. However, they  
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participate in informal gatherings and groups in the village as an entry point for 
further cooperation. There are indications that the poor are not “lost” for collective 
action and that different ties and links exist offering a potential to be strengthened 
by external temporary support by NGOs or other initiatives. However, empirical 
results show that in the rural fabric the poor are more likely to comply with rules 
and mechanisms only but not to take deliberate action to shape them and to defend 
them actively.  
Complementary to this, the role of religious festivities and Buddhist values 
and norms needs further consideration. Jointly exercised religious activities are an 
instrument to enhance cooperation in and between villages, and are explicitly used 
by political entrepreneurs and local leaders as a means to protect natural capital 
and to contribute to social cohesion and trust. Built on religious initiatives and the 
overall imperative of harmony, people start to communicate experiences where 
collective action had been successful to protect their interests against government, 
military, large scale investors or others. They do not actively protest and 
demonstrate but begin by formulating petitions and memorandums to raise 
awareness of their problems, to address conflicts, and ask for external support. 
Although these activities might be assessed as rather defensive and “shy,” they 
should also be regarded as a starting point to rely more on collective action to 
protect property rights and to make use of reformed property rights systems which 




APPENDIX A.  
 
Rules of the Trust Game 
During the experiment the group of players has been divided into two sub– groups: 
The “first–movers”, here referred to as players A, and the “responders”, here 
referred to as players B. Each player A is coupled with a player B but the exact 
match is unknown to the players, meaning no player A knows who is player B he or 
she is playing the game. To start the game each player A receives an amount of 
money as initial endowment. Now, player A can decide to keep or (partially) send 
his endowment to his unknown counterpart in group B. The amount sent by player 
A is tripled and given to player B on top of his or her initial endowment being 
identical to that of group A. Now the player of group B owns the tripled fraction that 
payer A sent plus his initial endowment. She or he has to decide whether to sent 
any amount back or keep the whole sum. After player B has made his decision, the 
money he or she sent back is given to player A and the game ends. Players A have, 
thus, to decide whether to trust their counterparts in group B: the higher the 
fraction of money sent, the higher the trust in their counterpart that their 
investment (the fraction sent) will pay off. The Nash equilibrium for selfish 
preferences is to pass nothing, since a self– interested person would return nothing 
of the amount received.  
 
Notes:  
1) All numbers on Table have been converted to US system of notation (such as 
0.66 for decimals). 
2) column for degrees of freedom was deleted since it is a chi– squared test 
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